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Abstract: Long run economic growth has again become a major focus of economic theory. A 
perception of technological change as an economic process with externalities has motivated 
the development of aggregate models that generate different steady state growth paths. 
Economic history has also long been interested in long-run economic growth. This paper 
engages in a dialog between growth theory and the historical literature on the industrial 
revolution in Britain and America’s surge to international economic leadership in the late 
nineteenth century. It concludes that economists’ recent thinking about the microeconomics 
of technological change has provided fruitful material for the economic historian of growth. 
Unfortunately, the models of endogenous growth, on the other hand, present too aggregated a 
view of the economy to prove helpful when confronted with the details of economic history. 
JEL Classification: N0, N1.1  
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“The Industrial Revolution marks the most fundamental transformation of 
human life in the history of the world recorded in written documents.” 
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. Industry and Empire (1968) 
 
 “The consequences for human welfare involved in questions [of growth rate 
differences] are simply staggering: Once one starts thinking about them, it is 
hard to think about anything else.” 
 
Lucas, R. E. Jr. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development” JME 22 
(1988) 
 
  Eric Hobsbawm and Bob Lucas explore the emergence of modern economic growth 
and its uneven incidence from two very different traditions. Hobsbawn, a traditional 
economic historian, grounds his understanding firmly in documented evidence. In contrast, 
Lucas, an economic theorist, creates an analytical framework to represent the growth process 
and then explore the implications of the analytical model. Neither of these approaches seems 
entirely adequate. Hobsbawm invokes telling examples to support a narrative. Lucas relies on 
scarcely tested aggregate models. I want to present an historian’s short contribution to dialog 
between these two traditions. 
  Were I limited to Hobsbawm’s or Lucas’ approach, I would probably side with Lucas. 
After all, economic growth is an aggregate process and failure to keep the aggregate clearly 
in mind leads to confusion. We are not, however, so limited. Economic history tied to 
national income concepts, but not confined to examination of simple aggregates, has 
contributed to our understanding of economic growth and I want to highlight some historical 
literature within the context of “new” growth models. It is not my intention to contribute to 
growth modelling here, but I do want to explore relationships between recent trends in 
growth modelling, conceived very generally, and the economic history of two of the most 
significant historical examples of the emergence of modern economic growth – that of Britain 
during the industrial revolution and that of the United States as it achieved per capita income 
dominance in the late nineteenth century. The disruption of ordinary growth patterns between   2 
1914 and, say, 1970 by the twentieth century’s wars and their consequences imparts 
particularly relevance to examination of this historical period as it constitutes a significant 
part of the record of modern economic growth that we have available. 
1. Growth models 
  I see two fundamental motives in modern growth economics, one that we might term 
microeconomic and one macroeconomic. Growth economics in the 1950s and 60s yielded the 
Solow (1956) neoclassical growth model (and its variants) that explored the implications of 
capital formation. Such a growth model tends, rather quickly, towards a steady state with a 
constant capital labour ratio and constant per capita income. In steady state, growth in per 
capita income occurs as unexplained technological change increases the effective stock of 
labour per capita. Empirical growth accounting exercises in the spirit of these growth models 
– starting with Solow (1957) article – showed that a simple neoclassical model did not 
explain much of twentieth century per capita income growth. Rather, most growth came from 
an unexplained ‘residual’. This residual connects, somewhat loosely, to technological change. 
To have the main cause of economic growth unexplained and exogenous was clearly 
unsatisfactory. The revived growth economics in the late 1980s focused on technological 
change and its implications. Growth economics, although motivated by the microeconomics 
of innovation, has focused predominately on macroeconomic aggregate growth models in 
which differences in steady state growth rates arises from explicitly modelled features.  
David Romer points out in his recent textbook (2001, p.98) that new growth models 
“differ from the earlier models in explicitly interpreting the effectiveness of labor as 
knowledge and in formally modeling its evolution over time. We will analyse the dynamics 
of various views concerning how knowledge is produced and what determines the allocation 
of resources to knowledge production.” Study of the nature and origins of new technology 
has long been a mainstay of economic history and new growth analysis has advanced our   3 
understanding by systematically explored a number of issues. First and foremost, innovation 
is seen as a purposeful economic activity that involves an investment of resources in 
anticipation of future payoff. Technology is not, however, a simple commodity. Its discovery 
inherently involves fundamental uncertainty (Rosenberg, 1998). Market failure arises form 
the public-good nature of new knowledge that reduces the payoff that innovators can capture. 
Consequently, investment tends to be under provided. Patent rights and public provision of 
basis research provide offsets. Some models see innovation produced by a decreasing-cost 
technology (due to large initial sunk costs) and explore the implications of the monopolistic 
competition that can arise. Other work explores technological change in a network 
framework that focuses on externalities arising from initial breakthroughs. These externalities 
often give advantages to the original developers of a technology that latecomers find it hard 
to overcome. On the other hand, the path dependence that provides advantages in developing 
a particular line of technology may also inhibit the development of new ideas. The creation of 
new technology with externalities, path-dependence, monopolistic competition and increasing 
returns to scale create the possibilities of multiple equilibria and provide fruitful stories for 
historians to explore. 
  Macroeconomists’ new growth theory has not dwelt on the microeconomics of 
innovation but mainly takes the form of aggregate models. Observation that recent growth 
experience has been “divergence big time” (Prichett, 1997) motivates a focus on dynamic 
models whose structure can generate different steady-state growth paths. The models 
incorporate investment in innovative activity with some form of technological externality that 
yield varying endogenous steady-state growth rates thus potentially providing appropriate 
tools to study of the effect of possible policy or environmental changes on growth 
performance.   4 
  Analytical tractability, of course, places constraints on theorists’ models. The models, 
with sophisticated dynamic behavioural assumptions, are highly aggregated. Usually output is 
modelled as a single good (although for some purposes some tractable desegregation is 
introduced) and technology change assumed to act very broadly on production of the 
aggregate good – that is to say in Harberger’s (1998) terms, technology acts like a yeast, 
leavening the entire economic process, rather than like mushrooms popping up here and 
there. A representative agent (usually) owns factors of production and make long term 
allocation and consumption decisions either as an infinitely lived agents (what Solow (2000) 
refers to as infinitely lived peasant families) or in the context of an overlapping generations 
model. There is, of course, room to question the realism of the ad hoc modelling assumptions 
adopted to achieve tractability.  
  The modellers’ interest in persistent effects and the desire for tractability usually leads 
the model to be analysed in its steady state. An economic historian may well ask how well 
these models help us understand important past growth experience. He may worry about how 
time is treated. For example, in an overlapping-generations model that takes, say, five periods 
to approach the steady state after a policy change, we are comparing steady states separated 
by about a century and a half while assuming unchanged background conditions. More 
generally, can the aggregations be accepted as reasonable simplifications because the insights 
that the models provide help deepen understanding? Or should we be cautious about drawing 
conclusions from these models? 
2. British Industrial Revolution 
Figure 1 illustrates the historian’s perspective on modern economic growth. In the 
century centred on 1800, the British economy shifted from one dominated by Ricardian 
forces, where real wages related inversely to population size, to a modern economy, with 
population and real wages growing simultaneously at unprecedented rates. Much of my   5 
research has used economists’ tools to study the British industrial revolution that coincided 
with this shift.  
Modern thinking on technological change helps to understand the industrial 
revolution. The initial breakthroughs in textile, iron and steam technologies arose from 
concerted search for innovative solutions but the magnitude of the technological gains were 
often fortuitous and unpredictable. Network economies were central to Britain’s increased 
technological leadership in textiles and iron in the early nineteenth century and the 
persistence of these sectors as key export industries until the First World War. First mover 
advantages generated skills and externalities. Network effects allowed high-wage Britain to 
remain the world’s low-cost cotton textile producer at the end of the nineteenth century even 
though the technology was now well established – even widely available with technical 
support from British textile machine-builders. The technological networks of the industrial 
revolution, however, extended over only a limited portion of the economy. Nick Crafts 
(2002) has recently investigated the extent of the contribution of steam power, often cited as a 
general-purpose technology, to growth between the industrial revolution and the First World 
War, in an analysis that considers both the direct effect on total factor productivity and 
induced investment. He finds that the technology had its greatest impact as railroads 
expanded in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Even at its peak contribution 
between 1850 and 1870, however, steam technology accounted for only about 0.4 percent per 
year to an aggregate annual growth rate of close to 2.5 percent.  
Aggregated growth models, although providing a useful framework and the 
underlying logic of growth accounting, offer only limited insights into this history. 
Technology change was just too disaggregated – mushroom-like rather than yeast-like – and, 
as general equilibrium might predict, market responses to varied to support the kind of 
aggregation the growth models demand. Nick Crafts and I have analysed the industrial   6 
revolution with computational general equilibrium models and find disaggregation 
indispensable. The computational model, however, allows us to stay in touch with the 
aggregate economy. 
Deane and Cole’s (1962, 1967) pioneering estimates of British historical national 
income indicated that growth accelerated rapidly beginning in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century. In the 1960s, analysis of these national income figures, combining 
aggregate and industry-level total-factor productivity calculations suggested that a 
widespread process of technological change generated growth. This supported an idea of a 
generalized (yeast-like) process of technological change consistent with an aggregate 
production function (Hartwell (1971), McCloskey (1981)). In the early 1980s, however Nick 
Crafts (1985) and I (Harley (1982; 1993); Crafts and Harley (1992)) separately re-examined 
the estimates of British growth in the half-century after 1770. Our results (now broadly 
accepted) challenged the prevailing ‘balanced’ growth view of the Industrial Revolution. 
Growth was much more concentrated in the ‘famous sectors’ (textiles, iron and engineering) 
in our results and aggregate growth was much slower than economic historians had thought. 
An implication of this finding was that technological change could not been seen as a 
generalized process but had only localized (mushroom-like) impact. This view of 
technological change challenged the utility of thinking in terms of an aggregate production 
function. 
In our view, the Industrial Revolution consisted crucially of structural shift. 
Technological change was far from general and Britain became an urban industrial society by 
1850 not through a process generalized productivity improvement that significant increased 
living standards, but by a process of specialization and international trade. The export 
industries, particular cotton textiles, grew rapidly. Britain became a trading nation whose 
consumption and production diverged significantly and, unusually, British agriculture   7 
declined rapidly as a portion of the overall economy. Agricultural products increasingly came 
from overseas, financed by the exports of a few particular industries that took on important in 
the economy far beyond their share in domestic consumption. At the same time labour left the 
farms for the cities but per capita income grew only slowly. 
  As our attention focused on structural change, it became appropriate to think in 
general equilibrium terms. Computational general equilibrium models provided a way to 
proceed and I developed a series of model to think about the evolution of the British 
economy. I started (1993) with a very simple model, benchmarked on national income 
estimates for 1841 (the earliest relatively reliable occupational census data), with limited 
disaggregation. My goal was to reconcile the findings of agricultural and economic historians 
that technological advanced rapidly in British agriculture during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century– probably more rapidly than total economy total factor productivity 
growth – with the marked shift in economic structure away from agriculture during the same 
period. The model contained two economies, Britain and the rest of the world. In each a 
single representative consumer owned factors and maximized utility. Production in each 
economy was disaggregated into four sectors: agriculture (with technological change and 
internationally traded), a ‘famous’ industrial sector (that experienced rapid technological 
change and traded with the rest of the world), a non-traded industrial and a service sector 
(both of which did not experience technological change). The model indicated that 
agricultural diminishing returns in the face the more than doubling of British population more 
than offset the effect of agricultural productivity improvements and were a major driving 
force in structural change. 
In 1998, Peter Temin (1998) produced an argument based on a Ricardian trade model 
that reasserted a more traditional view of broadly based technological change (which is more 
compatible with macro growth models). He pointed out that mid-nineteenth century Britain’s   8 
exports were not confined to the ‘famous’ industries but were broadly based across the 
industrial spectrum and he inferred broad technical change. In response, Crafts and I (2000) 
elaborated the CGE model to incorporate more detail in international trade.  We 
disaggregated the manufacturing sector into cotton textiles, other textiles, metal industries, 
other traded manufactures and non-traded industry to investigate the trade structure in greater 
detail and to model different productivity advances across industries. In addition, more 
detailed attention to international trade necessitated explicit modelling of the fact that in 1841 
raw cotton, the great cotton textile export-industry’s raw material, made up nearly ten percent 
of British imports.  The model showed that (mushroom-like) technological change 
concentrated primarily in the ‘famous’ industries was consistent with the observed pattern of 
British trade and broad-based (yeast-like) technical change probably was not.  
Our analysis shows that relative price changes produced by the technological change 
and by diminishing returns in British agriculture were central. By the 1780s the new spinning 
technology had lowered cotton textile production costs substantially. Competition, initially 
often ignoring Arkwright’s patents, responded to profit opportunities and output expansion 
drove down prices. Sales boomed, at home and abroad, in response to lower prices. 
Technological change similarly affected some other manufacturing industries that also 
produced exportable goods. At the same time, British population approximately doubled, and 
the accompanying demand for food potentially placed severe pressure on Britain’s land 
resources. The newly cheap British goods attracted foreign buyers and presented the 
opportunity to overcome the effects of agricultural diminishing returns, transforming Britain 
into an urban industrial society in the process. The new exports, however, did not displace 
exports of traditional industries that had not undergone technical transformation because the 
falling prices of the growth industries limited the foreign resources they could command. 
With rising population, imports of food still required other exports. The price and quantity   9 
response to technological change, of course, created a classic index number problem that 
challenges the appropriateness of aggregation. 
.  Britain’s initial technological breakthrough and the subsequent maintenance of 
leadership in industrial technologies, however, only partially explain the economy’s 
precocious industrialization. Britain’s agriculture was as distinctive as its industry and 
probably played a larger role in causing industrialization and income growth. Computational 
general equilibrium examination of difference between mid-nineteenth century Britain and 
the other advanced economies of the time, shows that the great export industries driven by 
technological explain less than differences in agriculture’s retention of labour (Crafts and 
Harley (2003)).  Nineteenth century British agriculture, of course, was unusual. It lacked 
peasants, so common elsewhere (including America of which I will say more later), and a 
capitalist structure of landlords, tenants and proletarian labourers dominated the sector. The 
implications went beyond the sociology of class and greatly influenced economic behaviour 
and structure.  
  Some simple statistics provide a starting point to thinking about this issue. In Britain 
in 1840, the share of the labour force and of national income generated in the primary sector 
were very nearly equal at 25 percent, implying equal labour productivity in agriculture and 
the rest of the economy on average. In European economies at Britain’s 1841 per capita 
income, on average 55 percent of the labour force worked in the primary sector but produced 
only 38 percent of national income (Crafts, 1986, pp. 55-6). Elsewhere in Europe, then, 
labour productivity in the primary sector was only about half that of the rest of the economy. 
The difference probably arose because a neoclassical labour market model prevailed in 
British capitalist agricultural but not in peasant agriculture elsewhere. A peasant farm appears 
to have retained labour until the earnings per family member fell below the wage in the non-
agricultural alternative. As a consequence, British agriculture generated significant land rents   10 
(about 40% of agricultural income) and allocated labour between agriculture and the rest of 
the economy on the basis of the marginal product of labour. Peasant systems, in contrast, 
tended to dissipate land rents by keeping labour on the farm after its marginal product fell 
below that elsewhere. We have investigated the role of industrial technology and this 
difference in the agricultural labour market in Britain’s industrialization with our 
computational general equilibrium model, suitable modified to separate the peasant from non-
peasant labour and to recognize a wealth holding class. As Table 1 shows, we find that 
differences in the agricultural labour market (line 2) had more influence than technological 
change (line 1) in generating British industrialization. Britain’s efficient labour allocation let 
to an increase in per capita income, but it distributed income to wealth owners and resulted in 
little gain in real wages.  
Despite our desire for parsimonious modelling Crafts and I have found that we have 
had to disaggregate considerably. We find that we need eight goods/sectors (cotton, other 
textiles, metal industries, other industrial traded goods, non-traded industrial goods, 
agriculture, services and imported tropical goods) to model technology and trade. In addition, 
peasant agriculture has led us to introduce three ‘classes’ of consumers/factor owners. We 
have also found it impossible to model cotton textiles simply in value added terms and have 
had include imported raw cotton as an intermediate good. In addition, since trade was central 
to industrial Britain, we have considered domestic and foreign production of these various 
goods as imperfect substitutes (an Armington specification). Higher levels of aggregation 
eliminate key features of British industrialization. Technology change can not be modelled 
adequately as neutral shift in an aggregate production function. In addition, the contrast 
between capitalist and peasant agriculture frustrates simple aggregation of labour.  
  While theories of innovation help illuminate microeconomic aspects of the industrial 
revolution, new growth theory then does little to help understand Britain’s lead in income and   11 
industrialization. In the aggregate, understanding British growth requires a focus on different 
rates of technological change across economic sectors, the microeconomics of labour markets 
and the working of allocation mechanisms within the economy. Growth models that focus on 
a global aggregate have limited explanatory content. 
  Perhaps, however, growth theory has a contribution and we should take a somewhat 
different perspective. The technological changes of the industrial revolution were localized 
and inadequate to generate higher steady state growth rates. But persistent higher growth 
rates did emerge, and this, as growth models suggest, indicate a shift in the aggregate process 
generating technology. If we accept this idea, however, it seems unlikely that we will not find 
the ‘yeast’ in the actions of firms took to generate specific technology. The important 
changes seem more likely to have been changes in the institutional structure of the state and 
society that provided incentives and property rights that encouraged innovation and 
investment. These changes were to be found in the rise of the particular British constitutional 
state and were caused by social and political processes not by the mechanical inventions we 
usually focus on (North (1981); North and Weingast (1989)). 
3. The Second Industrial Revolution and American Leadership 
  The industrial revolution created an urban industrial society in Britain but was more 
clearly structural change in an open economy than accelerated growth. To be sure, as Figure 
1 shows, Britain broke the inverse connection between population growth and real wages at 
this time; even though real wages did not increase much between 1770 and 1840 population 
doubled. Greg Clark (2001) has recently suggested that perhaps this should be seen as a 
regional concentration of activity rather than the beginnings of modern growth. Britain came 
to resemble a giant urban area within Western Europe, fed by imported foodstuffs from 
Ireland and the Baltic and with a cotton industry whose imports of raw materials freed it from   12 
constraints of land. He prefers to see the aggregate technological breakthrough to modern 
economic growth in the late nineteenth century and centred in the United States.  
Certainly, as Table 2 shows, acceleration of per capita income, even in Britain, dates 
from the middle of the nineteenth century rather than to the late eighteenth century. On 
average the Western European economies began to converge on British levels of per capita 
income only late in the century and American growth surged after the Civil War. 
Convergence of European levels of per capita presents no surprise in the context of a Solow-
type growth model. Economic historians (e. g. Landes (1969), Pollard (1981)) have 
emphasized technological diffusion as the driving force, which Gerschenkron (1962) 
elaborated with a theory of endogenous institutional change. America’s surge to world 
economic leadership, however, does not fit the simple growth model and is thus much more 
interesting. In 1870 America’s real per capita income lagged nearly a quarter below that of 
Britain, although it exceeded the European average by a fifth. A simple catching-up model 
would predict that the United States would have grown somewhat faster than Britain as it 
caught up, but somewhat slower than the Continental economies with their larger 
productivity gap. In fact, America overtook Britain and grew faster than Europe. In 1913 
America’s real per capita income exceeded Britain’s by some eight per cent and had 
increased it lead over the Western European average to more than forty percent (Maddison, 
(2003)). America’s surge, of course, continued in the twentieth century but the world wars 
and their consequences complicate analysis. Nonetheless, in 1950, American real per capita 
income was forty percent above that of the United Kingdom and close to double that of the 
average of the European economies. The data on America’s surge to per capita income 
dominance will not surprise anyone familiar with the narratives of the economic history of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This was, after all, the period in which 
Americans developed mass-production techniques culminating in ‘Fordism’ and American   13 
firms developed new industrial organization that supported large, integrated firms capable of 
exploiting economies of scale and scope (Chandler (1977; 1997)).  
  America’s surge to international dominance has long interested economic historians 
and some of their ideas connect to central ideas in growth theory. It is useful to organize the 
literature into three strands (although some of the most interesting contributions span more 
than one area). First, there were studies that drew on the basic neoclassical models of growth 
and trade. Second, disaggregate studies have traced relative national income growth. Third, 
the strand I find most interesting, has focused on the nature of technological change and 
argued that initial conditions and network economies directed technical change in America in 
a unique direction with important productivity consequence. 
3.1 Neoclassical aggregate traverse 
  American growth accelerated dramatically after the Civil War ended in 1865. 
Aggregate output, supported by population growth of over two and a half percent annually, 
grew at close to five percent per year in the 1870s and 1880s. Growth rates slowed somewhat 
in the following decades but America continued to grow decisively faster than the rest of the 
world. Peter Temin (1971) pointed out that this growth could be seen as the traverse of a 
neoclassical economy in which investment dramatically increased. Robert Gallman (1986) 
showed that capital formation rates nearly doubled from between 14 and 16 percent of 
national income before the Civil War to between 22 and 28 percent thereafter. A sudden 
increase in capital formation, as occurred in the United States, will initiate a growth traverse 
from an initial steady state to a new higher income steady state. Capital per worker initially 
increases rapidly generating growth per capita. As the capital stock grows, however, its rate 
of growth slows, even though investment remains a high share of income, and the economy’s 
growth rate returns to its steady state – set by labour force growth and technological advance. 
Nineteenth century America appears to have followed such a path (Table 3). Late nineteenth   14 
century aggregate growth was high because population growth was high and because the 
investment rate increased leading to a near doubling of the ratio capital stock per capita 
despite the rapid population growth. As the economy approached its steady state at the end of 
the century, the rate of growth slowed. Aggregate total factor productivity growth did 
accelerated during this period, but accounted for only about a fifth of the total growth of the 
economy, although, to be sure, it contributed much more to the growth of per capita income. 
Even so technological change explained less than half the growth of per capita income 
(Abramovitz and David (2001), A11-14).  
The traverse caused by increased capital formation raises obvious questions about the 
changed rate of investment. Jeffrey Williamson (1974a, b) attributed acceleration of capital 
formation principally to Civil War financing. The North financed the war by debt and money 
issue along with increased taxation. After the war, taxes remained high and federal budget 
surpluses, after a brief period of retiring the greenback monetary issue, retired interest-
bearing debt. Williamson argues the debt retirement “crowded in” investment in physical 
capital as wealth holders replaced claims on the government with claims on the physical 
capital stock. He did not does not consider issues of “Ricardian equivalence” – the fact that 
assets in the form of government liabilities create an offsetting liability in the form of the 
present value of future taxes. He pointed out, however, that the taxes retained from the Civil 
War, largely tariffs and excises, fell principally on consumption goods.  Consequently future 
tax liabilities lay on a large base of taxpayers who accumulated few assets while a rich 
minority held the government debt. The higher savings rate was augmented by a sharp 
decline in the relative price of investment goods, allowing each dollar of savings to purchase 
a larger amount of physical capital. Williamson finds Civil War financing policy also caused 
the relative price change, pointing out that the tariffs increased consumption goods prices 
relative to capital goods.   15 
  Moses Abramovitz and Paul David (1973; 1996); David, (1977)) provided a 
somewhat different perspective on the roles of “thrift and the progress of invention” in the 
post Civil War growth spurt. They, too, see an investment-induced traverse in an aggregate 
growth model. However, their explanation of its underlying nature differs considerably from 
Williamson’s because they integrate savings behaviour with technological change. They 
point out that interest rates fell only slightly in response to the doubling of the reproducible 
capital stock per capita during the late nineteenth century, and that the share of national 
income accruing to capital actually increased. They argue that the aggregate production 
function (at any particular level of technology) is unlikely to be characterized by an elasticity 
of substitution between capital and labour that exceeds unity. They propose, therefore, that 
technological change in late nineteenth century America had a capital-using bias that 
increasing the marginal product of capital (and profits) thereby providing an underlying cause 
of accelerated capital formation. As they conclude (1973, p. 437): 
In the terms of our parable of a single-sector economy, the long disequilibrium 
passage to higher wealth-income proportions which characterized the U.S. 
nineteenth century experience, therefore, is not properly regarded as the 
consequence of the greater exercise of Trift. To be sure, the real gross savings 
rate (conventionally defined) did rise dramatically, from about 10 percent 
before 1840 to 16 to 20 percent in the decades immediately preceding the 
Civil War, and thence to the 25 to 30 percent level in the period 1869-1899. 
And without the entailed rise in the net capital formation proportion, the 
approximate doubling of the capital-output ratio could not have been achieved. 
Yet, to conceive of this grand traverse simply as an equilibrating adjustment to 
an autonomous, exclusively supply-driven rise in the savings rate in relation to 
the growth rate of population and the labor supply would overlook the very 
reason for its having a potent effect in lifting the level of labor productivity 
instead of simply drastically depressing the real rate of return on capital. The 
historically conventional capital-deepening bias of technological progress, by 
exerting upward pressure on the real rate of return, in our view must have 
played some direct part in eliciting and maintaining the higher real savings 
rate established over the course of the century. 
 
They also point out the historically specific nature of their characterization of the late 
nineteenth century growth. Capital-using technological change stimulating the formation of 
physical capital gave way in the twentieth century to technological change that increased the   16 
value of human capital. Human capital using technology, in a similar manner, supported 
massive increases in educational attainment that have characterized twentieth century 
America (and other advanced economies). 
3.2 Neoclassical globalization 
  In the late nineteenth century trade expanded and impressive globalization occurred. 
Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson (2000), with other contributors, have examined the 
era in terms of neoclassical trade theory. They observe that real incomes, and particularly real 
wages, converged among the countries that now make up the OECD that they attribute 
relative income movements in the late nineteenth century to globalization. Product markets 
integrated as falling transportation costs and reductions of trade barriers caused product 
prices to converge – in particular European food prices fell. Specialization of production 
increased, raising the real incomes of abundant factors, and factor prices converged. 
Globalization of labour markets and the resulting emigration from densely populated Europe 
to the New World caused an even more convergence of real wages. Globalization of capital 
markets furthermore contributed to convergence, but with somewhat smaller impact. 
  O’Rourke and Williamson draw strong conclusions about the strength of neoclassical 
convergence forces primarily from a series of panel regressions among countries. Close 
examination reveals that the wage experience of a few countries drive the regression 
relationship and globalization forces were much less apparent elsewhere. In Ireland, Sweden 
and, at the very end of the pre-war years, Italy – all initially poor – emigration was associated 
with significant real wage increases relative to rich regions. At the other end of the wage 
spectrum, Australia, the richest country of the late nineteenth century, experienced real wage 
stagnation in conjunction with immigration flows. In most of Europe, however, there was 
little connection between globalization and income. In particular, Britain experienced very   17 
heavy immigration, which O’Rourke and Williamson see as the most powerful force 
affecting real wages, but also slow real wage gains. 
  Most strikingly, however, America’s experience belies the neoclassical globalization 
story. To be sure, America’s relative land prices rose in response to exports of land-intensive 
goods, but American relative real wages also rose in spite to the import of labour-intensive 
goods and, more importantly, massive inflows of immigrants. It is certainly hard to rely on a 
neoclassical analysis of nineteenth century globalization that emphasizes forces leading to 
convergence when the most important economy in the globalization does not conform. 
  Globalization effected America differently than O’Rourke and Williamson’s 
neoclassical analysis predicts. As they make clear, falling transportation cost, which arose 
from technological change in iron production and steam power, drove globalization but 
neoclassical trade theory, which implicitly treats countries as single points, poorly captures 
the effects of these innovations in America. In America, globalization stimulated divergence 
forces rather than triggering convergence. Transportation cost driven globalization increased 
the relative resource abundance of already resource abundant American dovetailing well with 
Abramovitz and David’s characterization of nineteenth century American technology as 
capital-using. Lower transportation costs gave value to America’s vast interior resources, 
stimulating enormous investments in railroads, urbanization and other capital-using 
infrastructure in the decades after the Civil War. In America, technology opened 
opportunities in the continental interior that could be exploited in the increasingly globalized 
economy. At the same time, American industry developed new technologies and organization 
to take advantage of the continental market. 
3.3 disaggregated growth analysis 
  Neoclassical studies at the aggregate level of growth or trade models hide important 
causal factors that acted in America at more disaggregated levels. Steven Broadberry (1997a,   18 
b, c) has examined America’s overtaking British levels of output per capita and Germany’s 
catch-up to Britain in greater detail. In both cases he finds that understanding the process 
requires disaggregated productivity analysis and that compositional features of national 
income played key roles. He finds, contrary to most expectation, that America’s surge to 
international leadership during the late nineteenth century did not stem principally from faster 
growth of productivity in manufacturing. American manufacturing industries had already 
achieved labour productivity levels nearly twice that of their British counterparts by 1870. 
This productivity lead increased by about a quarter during the first half of the twentieth 
century but made only a small contribution to the surge that took America’s aggregate output 
per employee from about 86 percent of Britain’s in 1870 to 154 percent in 1950. Part of 
America’s faster growth came from faster increases in productivity in agriculture and mining 
and services. Of equal importance, however, was the shift of labour in America from low 
productivity agriculture to higher productivity employment in manufacturing and elsewhere. 
  Reduction in agricultural employment was central to America’s surge to leadership 
and harks back to comments I made about peasant agriculture earlier. In Britain, you will 
recall, output per worker in agriculture in the middle of the nineteenth century equalled that 
of workers elsewhere in the economy. In the aggregate statistics, American agriculture 
resembled Continental peasant agriculture. In the 1880s labour productivity in agriculture 
was only about sixty percent of that elsewhere in the economy. At the same time nearly half 
the labour force worked in agriculture. By 1929, although the labour productivity in 
agriculture remained about half productivity elsewhere in the economy, the proportion of the 
agricultural labour force had declined to just over a fifth of the total. Some of the lower 
output per worker in agriculture reflected cost of livings differences and compensation for 
higher unemployment elsewhere (Hatton and Williamson (1991a; 1991b)) but there also 
seems to have been a ‘peasant’ labour allocation similar to that in Europe. It seems   19 
paradoxical to see America agriculture, with its undoubted international comparative 
advantage and leadership in the application of labour saving farm machinery, as a peasant 
sector excessively hoarding labour, but statistics seem to indicate that this was the case. At 
any particular time, the productivity of labour in American agriculture was a declining 
function of its labour force. At the extensive margin in the western prairies additional labour 
may not have been less physically productive but it produced output of lower value because 
of the higher transportation costs when farming moved to more remote areas. At the intensive 
margin, a higher labour/land ratio lowered productivity. Family control of the “means of 
production” encouraged labour to remain on the farm until the earnings per family member of 
the farm fell below the wage in the non-farm sector. This dissipated the farm’s rent and drove 
the marginal product per worker in agriculture below that in the non-agricultural sectors. As 
the farm sector became less important less potential income was dissipated and national 
income increased.   
  Broadberry’s findings of the importance of compositional changes in America’s 
growth surge highlight the need to consider compositional aspects of the economy and their 
evolution in analysing growth even over long periods of time. Similar aggregate growth from 
labour reallocation occurred in Continental Europe’s rapid growth in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Denison (1967), Kindleberger (1967)) and in the rapidly growing Asian 
economies at the end of the century. However, although Broadberry’s work directs attention 
to the composition of national income and the implications of sectoral redistribution, when all 
is said and done, America’s success rested on high productivity outside of agriculture.  
3.4 America’s technological network 
  Although Broadberry shows that American manufacturing already had very high 
relative levels of productivity at the middle of the nineteenth century that increased only 
slightly over the next century, it is important to keep in mind that maintaining industrial   20 
leadership meant that American firms continuously developed new high productivity 
technologies. The manufacturing sector, which consisted of textiles and raw material 
processing at mid-century, developed new machinery-making and iron and steel sectors 
before the First World War and consumer durable industries in the twentieth century. 
Continued success in developing high productivity techniques in new industries suggests that 
we should seek yeast-like characteristics of technology that transcended individual sectors. 
Some of the most interesting research in American economic history has gone in that 
direction. 
  Mass-production manufacturing (Fordism) developed in America and historians have 
traced its development to distinctive American engineering practices before the Civil War. 
Although we take mass-production with interchangeable parts to be the natural method of 
industrial production, in fact, it took on its present form only with Ford’s introduction of the 
moving assembly line for his Model T in 1913. Mass-production’s roots are found much 
earlier, however. American techniques, particularly in gun-making and woodworking where 
machine-formed parts were replacing individually fitted parts, impressed British observers in 
the 1850s (Hounsell (1984)). An historical literature analyses why advanced machine 
technologies emerged in America in the early nineteenth century, where overall industrial 
techniques were relatively backward, before they appeared in Britain, whose engineering 
firms were undisputed technology leader. The modern discussion dates from Hrothgar 
Habakkuk’s (1962) analysis of the American technological trajectory. He argued that land-
abundance created high wages and led American firms to choose capital-intensive methods of 
production. He then proposed an endogenous process of technological change, rather in the 
style of Arrow’s learning by doing, that led American technological change on a different 
path than that followed by the British. Leaning by doing with American capital-intensive 
technology proved particularly fruitful and led to technological leadership.   21 
  Peter Temin (1966) pointed out, however, that Habakkuk’s argument contained a 
logical flaw. In an early application of a three-factor trade model, he demonstrated that 
Habakkuk’s analytic structure contained two constant-returns sectors – agriculture used land 
and labour and land abundance led to high real wages; while industry used labour and capital. 
In this kind of model, the American manufacturing sector depended on tariff protection to 
raise manufactured goods prices. Real wages in manufacturing (measured in manufactured 
goods) could only have been higher than in Britain if real capital prices (capital goods, which 
were American manufactured goods, times the rental rate on capital) were lower. However, 
interest rates were higher in America than in Britain. 
  Temin’s challenge sharpened the debate, but the prevailing view, although more 
complex, came to follow Habakkuk’s initial surmise. Resolution arose from considering the 
choice of techniques in America more closely and extending the analysis of the 
manufacturing sector beyond a model of single good produced by two inputs (Ames and 
Rosemberg (1968), Rosenberg(1982; 1984)). Several elements caused American firms 
initially to choose different methods of production and continued to influence American 
practice throughout the century. American firms, protected by tariffs, developed techniques 
of production that favoured local factor prices and product markets. Temin correctly pointed 
out that capital was not particularly cheap in America. However, natural resources were 
abundant and cheap while skilled labour was expensive relative to the unskilled immigrants 
who made up most of the American industrial labour force after the 1840s (Harley (1974)). In 
addition, American’s relatively high real wages (in terms of consumption goods) and modest 
class differences created a mass market for standardized manufactured goods. The ‘American 
system of manufacturing’ developed under these conditions. Firms adopted mechanized 
production because machine techniques, although they used expensive capital and were 
wasteful of (cheap) raw materials and energy, economized on expensive skilled labour. In   22 
addition, the economies of the machine techniques depended on high throughput of 
standardized goods. The tariff and America’s income distribution provided a market for such 
goods. European firms did not find it profitable to follow the American lead. Raw materials 
were more expensive, skilled labour cheaper and mass markets for standardized products less 
developed. 
  A number of important studies have explored America’s early nineteenth century 
technological choices and their implications in the establishment of a particular American 
technology in the nineteenth century (David (1975), Rosenberg (1963; 1982; 1994), Nelson 
and Wright (1992), Wright (1990; 1999)). The history of American technology exhibits 
characteristics central to endogenous growth. Gavin Wright has recently emphasized two 
features: “First, that technological progress was a network phenomenon, growing out of the 
actions of large numbers of interacting people–not necessarily in formally structured 
institutions of coordination. Second, that these networks were strongly national in character.” 
(1999, p. 295). American industrialization began with the cotton industry, which consciously 
developed machines that could spin and weave coarse cloth while tended by young girls 
without depending on the British industry’s skilled mule spinners and handloom weavers 
(Saxonhouse and Wright (1984)). America’s engineering industry emerged from the 
machines the cotton mills built (and from government research in weapons armouries and 
military contacts).  As Nat Rosenberg (1963) points out, the machine-tool firms became the 
vehicle for diffusion of the machine technology though out the economy. Machine-based 
production became widespread and when machine-makers solved specific production 
problems, they adapted the techniques to other uses. The high level of mobility of skilled 
innovators and their students within the machine-tool industry strengthened the network.  
Initial conditions of industrialization set the stage for a particularly American learning 
by doing. America had chosen different techniques, often in industries that served tariff-  23 
protected homogeneous national markets. American technology evolved from this beginning. 
Machine development stimulated metallurgical and energy innovations. American 
techniques’ heavy appetite for raw materials and energy stimulated the exploration and 
development of American mineral wealth (David and Wright (1997). The national character 
of the successful technological network partially reflected the relatively poor communications 
network of the nineteenth century and the lack of international educational and professional 
ties. More important, however, was the difference in the market conditions. Because 
American firms operated under different cost and market conditions than prevailed in Britain 
or elsewhere in Europe, the national character of its network externalities was reinforced. By 
the late nineteenth century, the America economy was much larger any other – a feature 
reinforced by the relative homogeneity of American demand. As a result, firms could extend 
specialization and reap accompanying productivity gains from large-scale operations. Scale 
effects, an idea that appears in several new growth models, played a significant role.  
The American technological network developed new industrial organization to 
accompany mass-production and mass distribution. Firms increased in size and complexity to 
manage timely receipt of raw materials and the sale of large quantities of standardized output 
that characterized high through-put technology. As Alfred Chandler (1977; 1990) points out, 
large integrated American firms developed managerial structures and cultures to support 
mass-production. The network process intensified in the twentieth century, as the managerial 
culture of these large firms institutionalized research and development within the firms. Nat 
Rosenberg has recently documented network development in chemical engineering 
technology (Rosenberg, 1998). In the early twentieth century collaboration developed 
between faculty members at MIT and the petroleum industry that resulted in systematic 
innovation not only in the petroleum industry but also in other chemical industries. The 
collaboration between MIT and the petroleum firms established a precedent for networks   24 
combining university and industrial research, which have become central to modern industrial 
innovation.  
  Despite the important (yeast-like) network effects in American technological 
development, however, we must not exaggerate their aggregate effect. Machine-building and 
the associated machine-using industries, although extensive, were a minority of even the 
manufacturing sector, which itself made up less than a quarter of national income; and the 
same can be said about chemical engineering. The essentially mushroom-like nature of 
technological change, of course, is hardly a surprise. After all, Robert Fogel (1964), in an 
early classic of new economic history, showed that seeing railroads as indispensable to 
American economic growth was seriously misguided. Nick Crafts (2001) has examined the 
impact of electrification in America along the same vein as he examined steam power in 
Britain and found that it could have contributed no more than a fifth to American per capita 
economic growth between 1899 and 1929. Recent calculations of the impact of the IT 
revolution in late twentieth century America find the possibility that it contributed as much as 
three quarters of a percent a year to American growth, but most of this impact arose from 
capital deepening induced by computer development. (Oliner and Sichel, 2000). 
  Just as in the British case, the finding of limited impact of identifiable mechanical, 
chemical and organizational and organizational changes on America growth is disappointing. 
After all, the economy has achieved a long-run path characterized by faster growth. As the 
endogenous growth models point out, this cries out for systematic feedbacks that generated 
faster technological change endogenously. Here again, the most likely answer lies not in 
engineering technology or industrial organization but in social and political characteristics of 
America. Much modern research points to the flexibility of the America economy and its 
ability to respond to opportunities. The potential list of causes is long. We should include 
such things as de Tocqueville’s (1848) identification of the character of American   25 
democracy, the importance of constitutional settlement and the tendency of the American 
courts to interpret property rights in a manner that favoured businesses and economic growth 
(at least until the New Deal court) (Davis and North (1971)). In addition, we might note the 
important role of immigrants who had already chosen change and whose presence in the 
American labour force seems to have aided the adoption of the high wage-high effort bargain 
that supported mass-production techniques (Wright, 1987). 
Lessons  
  What lessons, then, do the industrial revolutions in Britain and America provide an 
economist interested in growth? The economics of technological change are certainly central 
to the historical story. There is ample evidence that externalities and network effects have 
characterized technological change. However, examination of the impact of specific 
technological change, even those technologies seen as general-purpose technologies, shows 
that process and product innovations were mushroom-like rather than yeast-like, pertaining to 
only a limited part of the overall economy. To be sure, modern economic growth has 
continued because technological change has become pervasive.  The key to this 
pervasiveness does not seem, however, to lie in technical externalities, but rather in social 
and political institutions that support continued learning and investment. 
The history proves disappointing for highly aggregated models. Understanding the 
history of the industrial revolutions requires disaggregation. The appropriate level of 
aggregation is essentially an ad hoc decision. In principal we would like both to disaggregate 
to the level of the individual good, producer and consumer, while at the same time, 
maintaining an aggregate view. In practice we are unable to carry on analysis in that manner 
and must compromise between tractability and detail. The appropriate chose will depend on 
the problem at hand.    26 
In our computational general equilibrium modelling of the British industrial 
revolution, Nick Crafts and I have found we need at least three ‘classes’ of consumers/factor 
owners and eight different industries with different technological experiences. At higher 
levels of aggregation we miss the elements that we see as key to British industrialization. 
Certainly a neutral shift in an aggregate production function inadequately models technology. 
In addition, the special nature of British agriculture frustrates simple aggregation of labour.  
  American growth has been somewhat kinder to aggregate analysis. Abramovitz and 
David emphasize aggregate feedback between biases in technological change and capital 
formation. The research on American technology suggests a particular American network of 
learning with broad implications. America developed a distinctive technology in response to 
particular initial condition. In addition, as many endogenous growth models suggest would be 
the case, America benefited from its larger size relative to European economies. Nonetheless, 
Broadberry’s finds important differences in sectoral experiences and a key role for 
compositional shifts.  
  Growth theory, however, has lesson for economic history. Models of innovation have 
enriched economic historians’ case studies. In addition, the aggregate growth models, 
although they seem far too aggregated for detailed historical analysis, direct us to the crucial 
issue of analysing underlying sources of differences in steady state growth rates. This focus 
highlights the importance of forces acting broadly, although perhaps indirectly, on the 
aggregate economy. The economic historian, however, is likely to conclude that these forces 
are more likely to be social and political than technological. 




Computational General Equilibrium Simulations: 
British Structural Shift in the Industrial Revolution 
   Agricultural 
labour share % 
Real wages  Per capita 
income 
1840 Benchmark Britain  22  100  100 
1770 Simulation  32  79  75 
Counterfactual Simulations:     
1. 
 No industrial technological advance  24  77  77 
2. ? of land peasant owned  47  99  59 
3. 
 
? peasant land and un-changed agricultural 
imports 
57  97  55 
Source: Crafts and Harley (2003) 
   28 
 
Table 2 
The Nineteenth Century Growth Transition  
(annual average per capita GDP growth) 
       
  1700-1820  1870-1913   
Britain    0.34    1.01   
Europe    0.06
1    1.31
2   
United States    0.73    1.80   
1Simple average of 5 Western European countries (Maddison (2000) p. 90). 
2Average of Western European 16 (Maddison, 2003). 
Source: Maddison (2000, 2003).
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Table 3 
America’s Late Nineteenth Century Traverse. 
         
1800-1855 1871-1890 1890-1905
         
Total Output  Growth  3.93  4.97 3.80
Intensive Growth  3.51  3.05 2.40
  Population growth  3.03  2.30 1.91
  Manhours per capita growth  0.48  0.75 0.49
Output per Manhour Growth  0.39  1.84 1.36
Capital stock per manhour  0.54  1.83 1.00
Total Factor Productivity  0.20  1.00 0.85
   
Source: Abramovitz and David (2001), Appendix A. 
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